An Analysis of Biden's Diplomatic Trends and China Policy in the Past 100 Days

                                                                                               

 (Editor's note: Biden's 100 days in the White House have brought about many domestic and diplomatic changes, which will certainly have far-reaching effects on the next political, economic, social and cultural developments of the United States, and will result in significant changes in the world landscape and Sino-US relations. It is worthwhile to do some systematic analysis and observation. What is published here is an analysis and summary of Biden's line in diplomacy for readers' reference. The Chinese version of this article was published  May the 1st in the Chinese section of our website)

 

     On April 22, at Biden's invitation, leaders of more than forty countries around the world participated via the Internet in a global summit on climate issues. The president of Russia, whose relations with the United States are strained, and the leader of China, whose bilateral relations continue to deteriorate, finally agreed to attend at the end. The fact that the summit was held as scheduled at a time when the  pandemic was still prevalent not only marks the reaffirmation of a worldwide consensus on climate issues, but also symbolizes the phased success of U.S. efforts to return to the center of world leadership, showing that the United States has regained the high ground in international diplomacy three months after Biden entered the White House.

    Trump's isolationism and the end of an era

      For four years, Trump's "America First" diplomacy pandered to these Americans, who have long been discontented with the damage caused by globalization and the significant costs of U.S. involvement in international affairs. By adopting an isolationist diplomatic line, abandoning games with emerging powers such as China on some international platforms, distancing itself from some traditional allies, and diluting relatively its adherence to some shared value goals, Trump won the applause of some right-wing voters in the United States. But from the perspective of international politics, this has seriously hurt the international image of the US and the expectations and trust of allies that the United States has spent huge resources to create after World War II. As a  whole, the U.S. foreign policy showed confusion and contradictions.

Here, we can give a few examples: withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement, an important coordination mechanism for the future of mankind. Trump's refused to recognize global climate change – a phenomenon confirmed by years of research by climate experts around the world and palpable in daily life –  until the California fires last September.  When he visited California after the fires, he still did not acknowledge the effects of climate change and even argued with others (1). Yet we can read in some of Secretary Pompeo's speeches his words about the reduction of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions' technological reductions as a U.S. contribution to the world (2). This is clearly contradictory and sends an inconsistent message, It was inappropriate for a world leader like the United States and undermined U.S. leadership.

Diplomacy requires a certain expertise, and in this regard, certain populist tendencies in Trump's diplomacy, in particular his brash style of acting, has hurt the enthusiasm  of American diplomacy and weakened the results of its efforts. We can see from the recollections of various Trump associates, such as security advisers and other related coverage, what the professional diplomatic staff suffered under Trump. In terms of meeting with the North Korean leader and the nuclear issue, one of the goals that three generations of North Korean leaders have dreamed of achieving through their nuclear strategy is to meet directly with the U.S. leader to get some kind of recognition and security guarantees. Months after Trump called Kim Jong-un "a deadly rocket man" at the United Nations, the latter called Trump a "dead old man and a coward" Trump accepted a meeting with him in Singapore, and then continued to praise Kim Jong-un, saying he would lead North Korea toward economic power. He and Kim were "in love" and Trump declared that "Kim Jong Un will prove everyone wrong"(3),. This was clearly reckless and frivolous, and it is Trump who has been proven wrong. We can understand that it is common for diplomacy to change positions due to various powerful trade-offs, and we can also understand and even agree with the U.S. attempts to reach some important results through diplomatic efforts, including meetings between the two leaders; but frankly speaking, it is worth discussing what the U.S. has gained when compared to the de facto recognition of North Korea from the U.S. after the Trump-Kim meeting, which is a huge advantage for them.

  In my opinion, despite the specific political background, especially the U.S. society's weariness of involvement in external affairs after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the many follow-up problems caused by the financial crisis in 2008, and the constraints of U.S. diplomatic interests, today it seems that Obama made some strategic mistakes in certain diplomatic issues during his term of office (such as the handling of the Syrian issue). In his now-published memoirs, the description of his handling of Syria is vague and evasive (4). In fact, I think  that at that time the Syrian case was one of the most important geopolitical conflict of the twenty-first century; it was the retreat of the West, especially the United States, at a critical moment that provided the conditions for Russia to return to the world stage and expand its influence in its own fashion.

It was a mistake for Bush Jr. to rush imprudently into Iraq, which caused many consequences; but it was not necessarily the right choice to retreat from Syria at a critical moment. In addition, in terms of the Iran deal, the agreement was signed in a hurry and was not perfect. For example, the issue of missiles and certain other roles of Iran in the Middle East should have been further regulated. However, the best remedy that Trump could have used would have been a two-way threat of cancellation, sanctions, and military action, a sort  carrot and  stick approach, and new conditions rather than an imprudent cancellation of the agreement itself. An easy cancellation would have severely damaged U.S. international credibility, while meeting with a nuclear-armed Kim Jong-un would have naturally spurred Iran and other countries to pursue nuclear weapons at any cost. A worldwide response to this issue, including the inevitable future challenges posed by technological developments, will require a combination of "hard and soft" measures, coordination among the major powers (especially the U.S.), and the cooperation of relevant international institutions in the long run.

Trump's "America First" policy served his goal of "Make America Great Again" and hadits logic. But it should be pointed out that the U.S. foreign policy has never been "America is not a priority", it has always been "America first." This is the norm of all countries' diplomacy. It is just that as the number one global power, the leader of the democratic and free world since the twentieth century, through two world wars and a cold war, the United States has naturally earned a well-deserved position of world leader. In fact, the US cannot help but play a certain role in providing certain kinds of public goods for world security. This is not only in the interest of the world, but also in the interest of the United States. The pivotal position of the dollar today is an example of this. The U.S. economy has been a "global economy" for more than 70 years, and today, as high-technology increasingly links the world, the world economy has become more deeply intertwined. The U.S. can never be outside the world.

 Twenty years ago, after 9/11, I wrote in a commentary that "the oceans that separate the Old World from the New are no longer the most reliable guarantee of American security; they are simply “Mississippi” rivers that take a little more time to cross" (5). The outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic proved this point once again. We of course know that the American tradition of "isolationism" has deep cultural, historical roots and psychosocial support. We understand the nostalgia of many Americans today. From a realistic point of view, we can also understand the need for the United States to make some foreign policy adjustments, such as requiring allies to make more security costs, appropriate withdrawal of certain troops abroad, and better control of illegal immigration. These are normal and in line with rational principles. Some of Trump’s adjustments are also in line with the interests of the United States. But it is an indisputable fact that the United States can no longer live in the dream created by "isolationism." It is not only a matter of will, but also a choice that must be faced. World leadership and isolationism are incompatible. This is the most fundamental problem of Trump's diplomatic chaos and the paradoxical perception of Trump's supporters on international issues. The future of the United States requires that it find a new balance, a dynamic one, between its isolationist tendencies and its ideal internationalism, all of this in the new international landscape.

Therefore, the United States needs to do a fresh exploration of the future. The strategic community in the United States has been in constant discussion about it over the years. Trump's domestic and foreign policies have a strong nostalgic quality; a nostalgia for the America of the 1950s and 1960s, which was also the era in which he grew up. This nostalgia based in various demographic and social structures, economic and cultural reasons, the impact of globalization, etc. is a considerable part of the present psychology of the public in the United States. From this perspective, we can understand certain trends of thinking in the United States and the election of Trump. But obviously, in the face of a new world, this kind of nostalgia is ultimately not helpful and cannot achieve the purpose that Americans want to achieve nor can they defend the interests of the United States. Trump played a role in breaking the old pattern in diplomacy as well as in domestic affairs. Many of these problems had accumulated to the point where a breakthrough was needed. But even if this breakthrough was destructive – as many breakthroughs in history are during major transitions – it has brought the problems to the forefront and exposed them. In fact, the breakthrough is preparing the ground for the US to face internal and external problems and to solve them in the future.

 However, in terms of shaping the new world order, Trump clearly lacked overall strategic considerations and was disorganized . Trump is a transitional figure in-between two eras. This has been my consistent view for years. The United States needs to face the future of the overall internal and external strategic thinking, the implementation of a coordinated strategy to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. The United States will remain in an unshakable leader position in the international arena for at least a number of decades, but only if it makes the right choices for itself and for the world. I have been reiterating the idea for several years that we are experiencing the end of an era and the beginning of a new one. The four years of the Trump administration and the Covid pandemic accelerated the arrival of this new era.

The Legacy of Trump's Diplomacy and Biden's China Policy

     While Trump's diplomacy as a whole has not been successful, the direction of his China policy is probably the most important diplomatic legacy that has been inherited. In addition, the restructuring of relations between Israel and some Arab countries in the Middle East is another relatively important achievement. These two achievements and their continuation are inevitable precisely because they are embedded in some historical and political logic and have been gradually ripening.

  The improvement of relations between certain countries in the Arab world and Israel is a result of the internal discord in the Arab-Islamic world and the changes in the Middle East. These discords  have been brewing for many years, and the promotion of Trump's diplomatic team has only brought them to fruition. The adjustment of his China policy is in line with the transformation of U.S. policy towards China over the years. Starting with the "Pivot to East Asia",  (East Asia strategy) under Obama, the U.S. strategic center has begun to shift to the Asia-Pacific in response to the rise of China. In fact, if not for "9/11" and anti-terrorism campaign, this shift may have come earlier. The discussions in the U.S. strategic community in 2014 and 2015 about China policy have heralded the formation of a new consensus on Beijing's among the left and right in the United States. It is the blind confidence of Beijing's leaders and some so-called "think tanks" that " “U.S.-China relations could not be better nor worse" and the arrogant belief that strong economic ties and interests can hedge out fundamental differences in security, ideology and institutions that have led to Beijing's serious strategic miscalculation. Of course, the characteristics of Trump's businessman president and his preference for economic and trade issues in relations with China are also believed to be an important reason for this miscalculation of  Beijing.

 The course of history is the result of the interaction of engaged actors, not something pre-designed. Washington's attitude toward Beijing is also to a considerable extent the result of the latter's behavior, a point I have mentioned on many occasions. But many of my friends seem not to see it that way, attributing certain changes simply to one person or party in a non-historical, ideological perspective. This is obviously worth further discussion. After Beijing's strong moves on Hong Kong, Xinjiang', the South China Sea, and Taiwan, after the general regression in internal rule-of-law, state building, and constitutional amendments, and after the international strategic expansion with military, ideological, and economic dimensions, it is entirely predictable that the backlash against China policy by the United States and the West as a whole will enter a new phase. It is inevitable that some of the views of the Trump team that advocate a tougher stance toward China will be widely accepted.

 While Trump himself has been, for one reason or another, highly vocal in praising Xi Jinping as a "great leader" and his "good friend," some changes in the aftermath of last spring's pandemic led him to radically shift his language and position, limiting it mostly to economic and trade conflicts with China, and escalating it to a full-scale discourse of ideological and institutional competition. His experience as a businessman gave him a straightforward sense of the importance of combating Beijing's economy, trade and technology, which was his strong suit. Whether the trade war approach was as successful as he envisages is another topic for discussion. To a certain extent, it was the promotion of his foreign and security team, including members like Matthew Pottinger and Miles Maochun Yu, who have a deep understanding of the nature and operation of the Beijing regime rooted in their personal experience. This was a significant part of Trump's China policy, the character of a precision strike, leaving Beijing in a very passive position.

  However, the effectiveness of these team members' China policy as a whole was considerably discounted by the Trump's isolationist foreign policy, It allowed Beijing to withstand the pressure from the United States while hedging it by expanding diplomacy in other regions and areas; for example, on global climate issues, world trade, and other issues, Beijing has taken considerable initiative and won some applause on these issues, making its efforts to further drive a wedge between the U.S with its traditional allies. Beijing might have made more diplomatic gains if its arrogant, wolf warrior”  style of diplomacy had not sparked all kinds of backlash in recent years, if it had been cleverly disguised. With the past period of U.S. incompetence in dealing with the pandemic, the containment of the pandemic in China and the resulting record-breaking growth in foreign exports, some internal turmoil in the United States, and the fact that it is experiencing a kind-of post-Vietnam War confusion and low confidence, Beijing has regained some confidence in its game with Washington.

Contrary to the aversion to Trump by the leaders of many democracies, some leaders of authoritarian-leaning countries wanted to see Trump re-elected, not only because they appreciate his strongman style of governance, but also because they believe that perhaps a Trump-led America would offer them more room for maneuvering.

   Reclaiming the diplomatic high ground and Biden's China policy

  In terms of China policy, perhaps some Chinese have made too many imaginative interpretations of U.S. policy toward China based on their own ideological likes and dislikes. In fact, in both the Democratic and Republican parties, there are pro-Chinese and anti-Chinese factions in both the left and right wings. It is just that their backgrounds and starting points are different, and it is difficult to judge them by one party, one wing or another. Some on the left may be blindly pro-China out of a naive leftist imagination of non-Western systems and an instinctive sympathy for developing countries, turning a blind eye or ignoring certain issues. Some on the right may be pro-China out of a consideration of their practical interests, especially coupled with an arrogant, superior contempt for the Chinese, believing that such a nation deserves only authoritarian rule and that freedom is an unnecessary luxury. As a result, they have become the guests and lobbyists of Beijing's political figures and many internal and external policies. Others on the right, on the other hand, have long adhered to traditional American values and are highly sensitive to the status of the United States and its security situation. They remain critical and vigilant of the Beijing regime's internal and external policies.  Those on the left who criticize Beijing are basically concerned about democracy, freedom and human rights in China from the perspective of universal principles of an ideal value. The preferences of the two parties, left and right, in terms of their focus on China policy are relative. Judging their policies toward China as a whole by party affiliation, left and right is highly misleading. For many geopolitical, economic, and ideological reasons, and especially because of Beijing's own actions as mentioned above, under strong public support and pressure, in recent years, the anti-China factions of the Democratic and Republican parties, the left and right wings have converged, while at the same time the pro-China factions of each side have gradually lost momentum and their voices. A new consensus on China has formed.

  Before Biden entered the White House, observers speculated about his diplomatic orientation, especially his China policy. In in mid-November last year just after the presidential election, I made the following prediction:

 Trump's China policy has caused a drastic impact on the structure of Sino-U.S. relations over the past decades, serving to completely break down the old framework, but it has not yet resulted in a new, more complete global long-term strategy toward China. Thus, it is clearly not enough for such a great power game, except that there is no longer a second term for Trump, and even if there were, it would obviously be difficult to achieve its aims in the end without more thoughtful adjustments. The United States can hardly win the global game without the assistance of its allies. It is unlikely that Sino-U.S. relations will improve much during Biden's tenure, and some aspects may make Beijing feel more pressure, which is the general trend. In addition to the structural factors that have contributed to the deterioration of U.S.-China relations, the dramatic deterioration in U.S. society's perception of China will eventually be transmitted politically and affect U.S. policy toward China. Bipartisanship is one of the few areas where there is a high degree of consensus on China policy. After his departure, Trump, including the Republican Party, will take a hawkish stance on China, and thus, both parties will compete with each other to show who is tougher on many China issues. Biden would be more internationally aligned in pressuring China on all fronts.

           Cooperation and exchange would be restored in limited areas such as the environment,     climate, atomic weapons proliferation, and pandemic prevention. On economic and trade issues: basically it would be free trade plus strategic control, operating in accordance with the laws of the economy itself plus political guidance, with surveillance on high-tech , leaving no room to China  for using  U.S’s technology to endanger U. S. Academic and cultural exchanges will be restored in non-sensitive areas, but will not return to the old days. The hostility of American society as a whole toward China will continue, and right-wing voters in the United States (and left-wing voters, too) will continue to be distrustful of China. They will also continue to be suspicious of and even hostile to immigrants, tourists, and investors from China. The biggest political difference will be the regrouping of the Western democratic camp, and the pressure to use democracy and human rights as a banner;

  Trump’s policy towards China was strongly unilateral, despite him borrowing the “Indo-Pacific strategy” initiated by Prime Minister of Japan Abe. But even these countries in the Asia-Pacific region still did not have enough confidence in the Trump administration and were afraid that Trump would change his mind.  With Biden in power, the alliance with the Asia-Pacific countries will only strengthen. With Biden's plan to convene a democratic summit, the structure of the two camps will emerge and become more obvious.

    Russia will be forced to make adjustments to further lean on China, and in Europe, to reduce aggression and ease the hostility of Europe towards Russia. The Indo-Pacific  quasi alliance (U. S, Japan, Australia and India) will also be strengthened or even upgraded, because now is still the main military, intelligence, political field. The United States could re-enforced economic and trade ties, in some form back to the TPP. In fact, the US is destined to devise a new type of economic intervention strategy to deal with China along with its important Asia-Pacific allies, including Japan, South Korea and Australia, have signed the RCEP. As for the important U.S.-Taiwan relationship, its strengthening trend will continue, but for the time being, it will not make more extreme moves to stimulate Beijing. … " (6)

In broad terms now, this is essentially how U.S. policy toward China under Biden has evolved, only faster, stronger and broader than expected. On the one hand, the U.S. rejoined the Paris Climate Convention and made addressing climate change, a serious challenge to the future of mankind, one of the most important issues in U.S. domestic and foreign affairs. Biden organized this global forty-nation summit, forcing leaders such as Xi Jinping and Putin, who would have been reluctant to support him, to attend, so as not to be passive in the international arena. Their participation gave the world the objective effect of endorsing U.S. leadership; the U.S. taking back this issue on the world stage. Secondly, the flag of democracy, freedom and human rights, which was relatively downplayed during the Trump administration, has been raised again.  This integrates US allies with the same values and secures moral resources for the U.S. world leadership position. One issue concerns the survival and future of humanity as a whole and the well-being of young people; the other issue concerns the dignity and rights of every individual, and the double-pronged efforts on these two issues have allowed the United States to regain the moral high ground in international diplomacy.

   In the relationship with allies, to take care of the security and economic interests of allies, to quickly rebuild the trust of allies in the United States, we just have to look at Japan's recent performance on China’s issues to make things clear: the United States, both publicly and privately, has certainly reassured Japan's security guarantees. Campbell, who is known as Biden's "Asian czar" for Asia policy, said that China needs to improve its relationship with Australia as one of the preconditions for the improvement of Sino-US relations (7), which I believe will also greatly enhance Australia's confidence in the game against China and send an important message to other allied countries. The summit of the four leaders of the Indo-Pacific countries has upgraded this coordination mechanism, which is rapidly developing into an alliance-style cooperation structure.

  As for Europe, Blinken's European trip and meetings with European allies and members of NATO were also very fruitful, with a respectful understanding of the European position on many issues and the initial repair of transatlantic bilateral relations. It is Russia's own confrontation with the U.S. on many geopolitical issues and its interference in U.S. internal affairs that has caused resentment in the U.S. political and popular circles, and that has kept pressure on Trump from those forces that have traditionally been hostile to Russia, sustaining some hard-line measures against Russia during the Trump era, even Trump's ambiguity attitude towards Russia.  But this ambiguity on Trump's part has also clearly unsettled Europe, which is directly confronted with the Russian threat. Biden's tough stance toward Russia is something that I believe Europe will be happy to see and is an extremely important factor that would help repair the partnership between the two Atlantic sides. After the recent call between Biden and Putin, the withdrawal of Russian troops from the border with Ukraine, where fighting is imminent, will obviously make Europe more aware of the need for close cooperation with U.S. 

  The "EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment" (which is in fact nothing more than a way for Europe to secure equivalent rights for European companies in China to those of U.S. companies), in which Beijing made some significant concessions, is seen as a strategic breakthrough for Beijing. However, given its approval mechanism and the general surge of European anti-China feeling, in my opinion, there was already a possibility that the agreement would not be finally adopted (8), and now, due to Beijing's high-profile and irritating counterattack against a relatively mild European sanction on Xinjiang issues, there is a high possibility that the agreement will be completely aborted. This would also objectively clear a small hurdle for the resumption of interaction between the two sides of the Atlantic. It is inevitable that the illusion of that model of separate politics and economics in dealing with China that some in Europe had hoped for will not eventually be dashed in the face of a Chinese mode of operation in which politics and economics can never be separated. Trump's policies have greatly stimulated Europe's attempts to seek some diplomatic independence in the future, but the Europeans clearly have great common interests with the United States, both in terms of shared values and traditions. They are also aware of the limits of their ability to face the future world landscape. After having already done good communication with European leaders via video, Biden will have a European trip in June, which is believed to further warm up and fully repair the U.S.-European relationship. The first guest Biden greeted at the White House was the Japanese Prime Minister, and the first foreign post-pandemic visit was to Europe, all of which sent a message that could not be more obvious.

While promoting the Biden-style "soft (values) approach," the Biden administration has also reinforced its "hard (force) face", strengthening its military presence by mobilizing several aircraft carrier groups in the South China Sea for successive cruises and exercises, establishing a "China Task Force" in the Department of Defense, maintaining high military spending, strengthening various military deployments and preparations targeting China; withdrawing troops from Afghanistan and focusing on consolidating resources to deal with China; high-profile declarations by security and intelligence services that China is the greatest threat to the United States, ......

  In addition, the Senate will soon pass the "Strategic Competition Act" with China, which is destined to have far-reaching consequences. Despite the fact that the U.S. and Russia have been vilifying each other and expelling diplomats, Biden spoke with Putin and agreed to a summit meeting, with the apparent goal of spacing out China and Russia as much as possible. During the campaign, Biden's side said that "Russia is the main enemy of the United States", but the U.S. is aware that Russia can only use what I call a "negative disturbance" to get the its influences; that is to say, it cannot take the lead in global and some regional affairs, but it can attack the existing international order led by U.S. This is the same logic that underlies its cyber attacks on the United States, and its actions in Europe, the Middle East, and other regions, as well as its support for China. Biden understands, of course, that a country with a declining population, an economy highly dependent on the export of natural resources, and a GDP less than that of a wealthy Chinese province, is clearly no match for the United States. The real opponent of the United States can only be China. The transition period has recently passed, and speeches from Biden to various key officials no longer disguise this point. Marked by assistance in the fight against the pandemic, various messages indicate that the game with China in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions, in various international organizations, and U.S. diplomatic activities has begun to escalate.

   The emerging Biden Doctrine and the "new Cold War" or "warm war"

    Let's put aside the evaluation of Biden's domestic policy and look at the diplomatic sphere alone. After only three months, a line we can call the Biden Doctrine is taking shape. Without repeating what has been said above, here is a brief summary of the broad outlines of what has now emerged and what it might become, a bold prediction of sorts.

   Biden's foreign policy will revolve around one fundamental purpose: to preserve and recreate America's position as a world leader in the new era and to lay the foundation for an American-led international landscape in the 21st century. Economically, it will correct the bias of the last wave of globalization and its negative consequences for the United States, especially for the American middle class and lower class; strengthen the foundation of U.S. economy, complete the renewal of American infrastructure and education, and reinforce American high technology and innovation to maintain its dominance in this area. Diplomacy should serve this purpose (9). As a departure from some previous positions, this year's attempt to reach an international basic corporate tax agreement for developed countries is clearly an important part of the process, which can also be seen as a move aimed at complementing Biden's domestic infrastructure rebuilding program. The political redefinition of a U.S.-dominated pluralist international architecture, which recognizes the need for pluralism, does not exclude it, and takes care of the interests of relevant parties, especially allies, but will be led by U. S. In this, climate and human rights issues will be the banner of its diplomacy. Returning to and taking ownership of international institutions from the point of view of playing games with countries like China in them. The United States will upgrade the military capabilities necessary to renew its absolute dominance, especially in the areas of sea power, space, strategic weapons, and high-tech information technology countermeasures.

  The United States will increasingly identify China – more precisely the Chinese Communist regime (a distinction deliberately made by Pompeo's team and others during the Trump era) – as the main threat, the main opponent of the United State. The United States will compete and confront China on all fronts, while not excluding cooperation on certain issues such as climate issues. The establishment of such a strategic rivalry will be conducive to internal integration, bridging political and social differences caused by various disturbances; externally, it will contribute to the demarcation of camps and the mobilization of international forces in favor of U.S strategic goals. If Biden succeeds in convening a world summit on democracy by the end of the year, as he designed in his campaign program, a world pattern that will affect the future for a long time will be formed. In my opinion, the "Belt and Road" expansion strategy, which integrates the ideas of "land power" and "sea power", as a kind of "westward strategy", which is more or less as a response to the "Pivot East Asia" strategy, will face a Biden-led expansion strategy of a global siege, from east to west (the Western Pacific), from west to east (the Atlantic Ocean, Europe),  and from south to north (India, Australia, Southeast Asia, etc.). The traditional geopolitical theories such as the "Heartland" and "Rimland" theories, which were so influential in the twentieth century, have long shown their limitations and are controversial, but in the new era we will also see some new versions of them and act in theory and practices. In fact, their influence has always been implicitly or explicitly present. From the Korean peninsula to Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, India ...... many factors against Beijing will accumulate rapidly. Beijing will intensify its military spending in response, entering into some kind of costly new arms race, with possible economic and social consequences for China that will slowly emerge in the future.

   The probability is that Beijing will gradually enter a situation of increasing passivity and overall strategic squeeze. The more passive it becomes, the more " wolf warrior " diplomacy, which serves the needs of internal integration, power games and self-preservation of bureaucratic interests, is likely to intensify, matching the rise of nationalist sentiment. This, in turn, will provide some sort of justification for an external hardline policy toward China. Biden, a veteran of Cold War diplomacy, is making reference to the experience of the Cold War to make overall and long-term deployment to China in the face of the new historical situation; including how to adopt various means to maintain U.S. interests economically and reorganize the industrial chain, international economic cooperation and regional pattern in favor of the U.S. world. Now, this senior politician, who seems to be a bit wooden and stuttering, is a skilled and sophisticated political operator, whose external and internal governance is much stronger than that of his previous boss Barack Obama, and will have a higher historical status in the United States than the latter.

China has entered a "new era" and the world has  also entered a "new era", to use the propaganda term that Beijing has been using in recent years. In 1948, the French political thinker Raymond Aron, used the phrase "Paix impossible, guerre improbable" ("Impossible peace, improbable war") as the title of the first chapter of his book "Le grand schisme" ("The Great Schism") (10), an expression that later became a reference to describe the "Cold War ".

  But in my opinion, the situation we find ourselves in today is more complex. Compared to the Cold War, it may be an era of relative security due to the intertwining of various interests, the relative fading of ideological overtones, the frequent interaction and contact between each other, the relevance of the interests of certain major issues such as climate change, the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of the costs to havea major military confrontation, and so on; however, conversely, it may also be an era that is even more dangerous than the Cold War because, unlike the usual proxies seen in the Cold War era there are many difficult issues of direct conflict of interests and geopolitics problems between China and the United States, especially in the Western Pacific, which cannot be easily resolved. And there is no physical instrument like the Berlin Wall, nor even some bilateral strategic agreements for security spacing and restraint as there was during the Cold War. Therefore, in a previous article, I  tried to call it the era of "Warm War" (11), an era of constant tension, where various factors can push the conflict upward into a direct hot war, or it can slip back into the old cold war state with considerable uncertainty. We are only at the beginning of this era, and its shape remains to be seen.

  Just how ready are the Chinese and others around the world? And in what way will this "new era" evolve and end? Only future history will give us the answer. However, this answer also involves and depends on a crucial question, a question that can only be answered by the Chinese themselves: what kind of future does China and the Chinese want? What kind of civilization will the Chinese have in the future?

Notes.

1, https://www.capradio.org/articles/2020/09/14/watch-president-trump-visits-sacramento-for-update-on-destructive-california- wildfires/? __cf_chl_jschl_tk__=a3d2a4b50cb7eb9a0344e81be630145d2c26f098-1619796226-0-AV6WJht28twNwmu00r1oyciMFUJU9osbYq- AWbn0ML6Fl4b8sxsy44YCBcfMEOTEpuZRnHK4HDAPlrLMRXpNPePuXnjIbmnfjo1JYP7Wv6lw7raAE-NrmRN4it2CkZKUPhBicFZ53iuwgcBtDZGH48pW93- scoAHRkpJg6AAguDXH9XY5ojCO2x8tnDHTnPuR0QV2DQbbVNaAmw48ISOmKoWhg7KY320eA_1n5pcA- 3yBJ2D9lRUkH9Tr5OFqYCXl0cqTrK0FI0ddCvPWB93sZmQCH4mWdXrbRfu8_VawwBkOrjjulTxUnEFxR8wARuZD- rMdj2NZqALQ2mjQrzDHWvlM9N5OsS1rlKGPKNEFymGx6EUxno6VZts9aUJSbRKNh1UVBenh1VLLwUCyDAS6xcUVAwfd_ cAdqqzkImHFZcKmg0YVFT71LyYVhxoi2CLtIzsUGD1KQV--5r9Sr2XzMjmrc-FslcVR_yCHy-H65Fb5dMMjGjlwFukIoE2udG_RZ1dAIttNPs9VN- gKpvhBGAsKXte8w7q4_I3mc05qcE9QfLlKat7F4dzj5eIZB38lF4QwHWx_OuzQcXFeqpsKR1SN4d46AB-klsa_Sn3c-Qf

2, https://share.america.gov/zh-hans/u-s-relies-on-innovation-to-reduce-emissions/

3, "Rocket Man" and "Bad Old Man": The full transcript of Trump's Kim Jong Un's war of words (BBC Chinese) https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-43348934

4, Barack Obama, A promised land, New York, Viking, Pengui Random House, 2020, pp. 652-653. 

5, Zhang Lun, "Let Love, Understanding and Reason Light the Way to Human Survival: Terrorism and the Challenges Facing Humanity in the 21st Century - Some Reflections on the September 11 Terrorist Attacks "The Times of Great Change: China, Cross-Strait and the World", Hong Kong, Trace Books, 2021, p. 286.

6, For the text of this lecture, see "The Expansion and Crisis of Modernity: Globalization, Information Technology, Identity and Beyond - A Talk on How to View a Turbulent and Divided World", published in "China: History and Future" website 2020, December 31, 2020

7. ‘Just not going to happen’: US warns China over Australian trade stoush https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/just-not-going-to-happen-us-war

8, see my  interview with journalists in early January https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhuanlan/daguogonglue/dip-01082021091511.html

9, See Secretary of State Blinken's recent series of speeches on U.S. foreign policy, each of which makes this point clear.

10, Raymon. Aron, Le grand schisme , Paris, Gallimard, 1948.

11, Lun ZHANG " Le maintien de la paix, de la démocratie et de la liberté exige plus que jamais de prêter attention à Hongkong " Le Monde, (Le Monde) https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/07/07/le-maintien-de-la-paix-de-la-democratie-et- de-la-liberte-exige-plus-que-jamais-de-preter-attention-a-hongkong_6045416_3232.html